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“I'm gonna make him an offer he can't refuse.” This famous quote from The Godfather (Mario 
Puzo 1969) seems to illustrate quite well the extremely interesting approach proposed by John 
Casey on the ad baculum argument. Indeed, the very notion of “offer”, which presupposes a 
choice, self-destructs, because of the weight of the implicit threat. It seems to me that, if we 
extend Casey's idea, it is crucially the elimination of any other standpoint that is at stake in the 
ad baculum fallacy.  
Casey begins with an ingenious remark that shakes the very foundations of the main 
issue of this conference: basically, how can the appeal to force have anything to do with the 
argumentation field? “No amount of force is going to make someone believe something”. 
Moreover, it seems even contradictory, since argumentation is precisely seen as a cure for 
tyranny and violence. Considering the ad baculum as a fallacy means, according to the standard 
definition of fallacies that it “has three necessary conditions: a fallacy (i) is an argument, (ii) 
that is invalid, and (iii) appears to be valid” (Hansen 2020). In the present case, one can 
seriously doubt about the conditions (i) and (iii). The fallacy ad baculum cannot look like an 
argument, let alone claim any validity or any sort. Why? Precisely because it is obvious that the 
premise does not, in any way, support the standpoint as well as it is obvious that no one can 
ever consider a threat as a good way to support the conclusion. One of the merits of John Casey 
is precisely to challenge the doxa about the “argument to the stick” by precisely considering the 
importance of such obviousness: the ad baculum is not meant to deceive anyone, it is not trying 
to disguise itself as an argument. Yet, it has some persuasive force and Casey offers a salutary 
reflection to renew the perspective on the argumentative scheme. The informal logic approach 
of the scheme missed the point: it is precisely because the appeal to force is obvious that it has 
a persuasive force and it is completely nonsensical to consider that any appeal to force will have 
an effect on believing p. Casey argues that the main point is not about believing p but about 
defending p, about being committed to p.  
I think that Casey’s demonstration is flawless and highlights with a great finesse the 
importance of not considering commitment and belief as synonyms. I will not write here a 
summary of his argumentation, which is perfectly clear and convincing, but I will try to expand 
his thought into two directions.  
In the rhetorical-pragmatic approach that I advocate with Steve Oswald (Oswald & 
Herman 2019, Herman & Oswald to be published), our aim is to explain why linguistic devices 
may trigger some cognitive effects and why some rhetorical strategies may be more efficient 
than others to trigger these effects. For this reason, I am very sensitive to the approach put 
forward by John Casey, which consists in starting from the supposed effects of a rhetorical 
strategy, instead of considering a theoretical model of what might be a cogent argument. Here, 
the effect of an ad baculum lies supposedly in increasing the possibility to believe p – and Casey 
points out that it is irrelevant. Let us be clear: it is not only a lack of relevance between a premise 
and its conclusion, but a lack of relevance of the whole rhetorical strategy. Now, if this strategy 
had no chance of being relevant, it would not have stood the test of time. If it continues to be 
used, it is probably because its effectiveness has been proven. Therefore, we need to find other 
explanations for its permanence. Those provided by natural logic, i.e. not realizing that there is 
no relevant connection between a premise and a conclusion, cannot be held, since the condition 
of success of the strategy is that the person who is the victim of ad baculum identifies the threat 
and the lack of relevance. Turning back into the intended effect and considering that the 
intended effect is not believing p but being committed to p, Casey offers a brilliant suggestion: 
the appeal ad baculum should be in fact considered as a double trigger strategy. The addressee 
of the appeal to force is merely an intermediary for future argumentation in which the addressee 
is now the speaker committed to p and may therefore increase the possibility to make his/her 
addressee believe p. I think that Casey’s paper illustrates that our explanations of argumentative 
schemes, fallacies or rhetorical strategies should never forget the intended or effective effects 
in their scope. Describing a fallacy should take into account why it has been used over decades, 
why it is considered as an efficient way to achieve a goal, where does the “persuasive force” lie 
in.  
After this first claim, I would like to investigate a second consideration about adopting p 
in order to make p believable downwards. The first step of the process – you are forced to adopt 
p and to be committed to p – as well as the traditional description of the fallacy by many 
informal logic textbooks is obviously focused on p. As a matter of fact, I think that the ad 
baculum is less about the idea of making people believe or, more accurately, adopt p than with 
the idea of preventing them from believing or adopting q - or any other proposition that is not 
p. Should we find the relevance of the threat, it would be directed to the idea that the addressee 
might defend something undesirable: i.e. not-p. This otherness seems to be obscured in many 
explanations of the fallacy. In the two examples given by Casey, the other proposition q is 
surfacing on a linguistic level: “if you don’t believe it” suggests in fact, by the virtue of the 
negation, that someone, probably the addressee, may not believe p; “of course you support our 
bill” by the unnecessary presence of an obvious observation suggests that supporting this bill is 
not expected at all. The high probability that the addressee might defend not-p is precisely the 
reason to threaten the addressee if he/she persists. Therefore, it seems to me that it could be a 
more appropriate way to describe the ad baculum fallacy as a way to eliminate any other 
standpoint than p; in pragma-dialectics terms, it would mean that the ad baculum fallacy does 
less violate the relevance rule than the freedom rule (“Discussants may not prevent each other 
from advancing standpoints or from calling standpoints into question” van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 2004, p. 190). And therefore, the persuasive force of the ad baculum lies in the 
fact that I might be forced to be committed to p and to defend it if asked, while still believing 
not-p.   
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